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CIRCUIT COURTS SPLIT: VICTIM OF A DATA BREACH?
CAN YOU “STAND” AND SUE IN FEDERAL COURT?
Darlyn de la Rosa*
ABSTRACT
As data breaches become more frequent, those whose data has been
stolen have begun to sue the companies that kept their personal data. In order
to sue in federal court for this issue, the plaintiffs need to satisfy Article III
standing. To satisfy Article III standing, plaintiffs need to show that they
suffered an injury in fact. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts
of Appeals have held that the risk of future identity theft arising from a data
breach is enough to establish the injury requirement under Article III.
Although not in a data breach case, the Eleventh Circuit has also found that
the risk of identity theft is sufficient to establish an injury in fact. In contrast,
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have refused
to find an injury in fact based on the increased risk of identity theft arising
from a data breach. Although not in a data breach case, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals has also found that the risk of identity theft is not sufficient for a
plaintiff to have standing to sue in federal court. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits
have not yet weighed in on the issue. The Supreme Court has also refused its
opportunity to address the circuit split. The Supreme Court should address
the issue and find that a data breach victim has suffered an injury in fact based
on an increased risk of identity theft because (1) previous Supreme Court
decisions regarding an injury in fact support that finding; (2) statistics and
legislative action show a correlation between data breaches and identity theft;
and (3) finding an injury in fact is the equitable result based on the
pervasiveness of data breaches and the burden a data breach imposes on a
victim, including economic and emotional burden. The Court should find an
injury in fact for all victims of a data breach, including victims of data
breaches that occurred during a physical laptop or box theft, and when the
information stolen in the breach is credit or debit card information.
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IV.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this digital world we live in, everyone is at risk of becoming a victim
of identity theft or some other data breach. With the rise of COVID-19,1 the
amount of people surfing the internet has increased, further exposing those
working from home and using their computers to obtain information about
the virus to data breaches and identity theft.2 But the biggest question of all
is, can we all sue?

1 COVID-19 is a respiratory illness that can easily spread from person to person, leading people
to practice social distancing, which includes working and attending schools remotely. See CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019
(COVID-19), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/2019-ncov-factsheet.pdf.
2 Preying on the public’s fear and need for information regarding COVID-19, hackers send emails
claiming to be from legitimate organizations with information about the coronavirus with a link for
statistical information. If the receiver opens the link, a malicious software will be installed on the
receiver’s device and that device will allow cybercriminals to take control of the receiver’s computer, log
their keystrokes, or access their personal information and financial data, which could lead to identity theft.
See Steve Symanovich, Coronavirus Phishing Emails: How to Protect Against COVID-19 Scams,
NORTON (Mar. 5, 2020), https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-online-scams-coronavirus-phishingscams.html. See Dan Lohrmann, How Is Covid-19 Creating Data Breaches?, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 30,
2020),
https://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmann-on-cybersecurity/how-is-covid-19-creating-databreaches.html (“Most experts believe that public and private sector organizations will need to address
numerous data breaches as a result of the extraordinary move to almost ubiquitous working from home
within a few days and without much time for planning.”).

18 - DE LA ROSA (DO NOT DELETE)

124

7/11/2021 12:37 PM

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 15:121

There are many examples of massive data breaches that have exposed
billions of people’s records around the world. For example, in 2013 and 2014,
a data breach on Yahoo’s database affected three billion user accounts and
compromised the real names, email addresses, dates of birth, telephone
numbers, and passwords of the users.3 The world’s data volume has been
continuing to grow significantly, giving cybercriminals a greater opportunity
to steal massive volumes of data.4 With the rise of technology, unlimited
access to the Internet for many, and the use of digital data, millions of people
are affected yearly by data breaches.5 As a result, data breach occurrences
have become a growing concern for many victims, who often seek relief in
federal court for their increased risk of identity theft as a result of the data
breach.6 Data breach victims often sue the company that had access to the
victim’s data for mishandling the data and allowing cybercriminals to get
their hands on it.7
Based on the rising nature of data breaches, federal courts have been
asked on multiple occasions to determine whether plaintiffs who have been
victims of data breaches can establish Article III standing based on an
increased risk of future identity theft stemming from a data breach.8
Specifically, these courts have been asked to determine whether the plaintiffs
have suffered an injury in fact, sufficient to establish Article III standing in a
federal court.9 The federal circuits are sharply divided over this issue.10 On
one hand, the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals have
held that the risk of identity theft is sufficient to establish an injury in fact
because the primary reason to execute a data breach is to steal the victim’s
identity, and therefore, a substantial risk of identity theft exists.11 The

3 Dan Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html.
4 Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DATA INSIDER DIGITAL GUARDIAN’S BLOG
(Dec. 1, 2020), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches.
5 Id.; Robert Siciliano, Identity Theft Crimes by the Numbers, BALANCE (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/identity-theft-crimes-by-the-numbers-4157714.
6 Joseph F. Yenouskas & Levi W. Swank, Emerging Legal Issues in Data Breach Class Actions,
A.B.A.
(July
17,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2018/07/data-breach/.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 884 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2018); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620
(D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert v. P.F.
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d
688 (7th Cir. 2015); AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928 F.3d 42 (D.C.
Cir. 2019); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed an increased risk of identity
theft based on a data breach but it has found that a plaintiff has suffered an
injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft under other
circumstances.12 In contrast, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have found that victims of data breaches have not suffered
an injury in fact based on an increased risk of future identity theft because
the alleged injury is too speculative.13 Although not specifically addressing
the risk of identity theft stemming from a data breach, the First Circuit has
also found that an increased risk of identity theft is not sufficient to establish
an injury in fact.14 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have not yet weighed in on
the issue.15
This article will address that based on the principle that victims of a data
breach suffer a “substantial risk” of future identity theft, these victims can
prove an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing because Supreme
Court decisions, statistics, and legislative action support that finding. First,
this article will provide definitions and background statistics on data breaches
and identity theft. Second, this article will describe the elements of standing
and under what circumstances the Supreme Court has found that a plaintiff
has suffered an injury in fact. Next, this article will analyze the current circuit
split on this issue, under what factual scenarios the circuit splits arise, how
the courts have reached their decisions, and the reasoning behind each
decision. Finally, this article will explain the Supreme Court’s current stance
on the issue and why plaintiffs who have been the victims of a data breach
have suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.

12 Christopher P. Hahn, 11 Cir. Splits from Other Circuits on Spokeo Standing,
MAURICEWUTSCHER
THE
CONSUMER
FIN.
SERV.
BLOG
(May
16,
2019),
https://consumerfsblog.com/2019/05/11th-cir-splits-from-other-circuits-on-spokeo-standing/.
13 Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc. (In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 870
F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck v.
McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
14 Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 77 (1st Cir. 2012).
15 Allison Grande, DC Cir. Piles onto Standing Split with Data Breach Ruling, LAW360 (June 28,
2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1173454/dc-circ-piles-onto-standing-split-with-data-breachruling.
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II. BACKGROUND
a. Types of Breaches and Statistics
i.

Data Breaches

Data breaches take place when a customer’s personal information
becomes exposed to internet predators.16 Specifically, a data breach takes
place when cyber hackers gain unauthorized access to a corporation’s
database.17 In these corporate databases, the cyber hackers usually find
customer data such as passwords, credit card numbers, Social Security
numbers, banking information, driver’s license numbers, medical records,
and other sensitive information.18 The purpose of hacking these systems is to
use this information for identity theft and fraud.19 Data breaches can take
place by physically accessing a computer or network to steal local files or by
bypassing network security remotely.20
Data breaches have affected the companies’ databases that most
Americans use frequently, and new breaches occur daily. For example, in
March 2020, Princess Cruises admitted that it was the victim of a data
breach.21 Possible data accessed included names, addresses, Social Security
numbers, and government IDs, along with financial and health information
of its customers.22 In addition, from 2014 to 2018, cyber thieves stole
information from 500 million customers of Marriot International, including
some combination of contact information, passport numbers, Starwood
Preferred Guest numbers, travel information, credit card numbers, and credit
card expiration dates.23 In May of 2014, a cyberattack exposed the
information of all of eBay’s 145 million users, including the names,
addresses, dates of birth, and encrypted passwords of all these users.24 In
2007, TK/TJ Maxx suffered a data breach where more than 94 million records

16 Steve Symanovich, What Is a Data Breach and How Do I Handle One?, LIFELOCK (July 31,
2017), https://www.lifelock.com/learn-data-breaches-data-breaches-need-to-know.html.
17 Nicole
Martin, What Is a Data Breach, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolemartin1/2019/02/25/what-is-a-data-breach/#66e350d14bbe.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Zack Whittaker, Princess Cruises, Hobbled by the Coronavirus, Admits Data Breach, TECH
CRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/13/princess-cruises-coronavirus-breach/.
22 Id.
23 Swinhoe, supra note 3.
24 Id.
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were compromised.25 In 2010, Sony PlayStation Network suffered a data
breach where 77 million records were compromised.26 In 2013, Target’s
server was compromised and 70 million records were stolen.27 In 2014, JP
Morgan suffered a data breach and 56 million records were compromised.28
Similarly, Chase’s database was compromised in 2014 and 76 million records
were stolen.29 In July of 2019, a data breach to Capital One Financial
Corporation exposed 100 million records.30
In addition, statistics of data breaches show an exponential increase in
the number of data breaches or the number of records affected reported since
2013.31 For example, in 2013, 614 company data breaches were reported,
resulting in 91.98 million records stolen.32 In 2014, 783 data breaches were
reported, resulting in 85.61 million records stolen.33 In 2016, 1,093 data
breaches took place in the United States, and that number increased to 1,579
data breaches in 2017.34 In 2017, 197.61 million records were exposed.35
While 1,244 data breaches took place in the United States in 2018, more than
446.5 million records were exposed, which is the highest number of exposed
records since 2005.36 In 2019, there were 1,437 breaches, up seventeen
percent from 2018 but below the number of breaches in 2017.37
ii.

Identity Theft

Identity theft takes place after a data breach when cybercriminals use
stolen customer data to make purchases, apply for loans, withdraw money,

25

De Groot, supra note 4.
Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/factstatistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) [hereinafter INSURANCE
INFORMATION INSTITUTE].
31 De Groot, supra note 4.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Joseph Johnson, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United States
from 2005 to 2020, STATISTA (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-breachesrecorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/.
36 Id.;
Ben Luthi, What Is Identity Theft, EXPERIAN (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-identity-theft/.
37 INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 30.
26
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or commit fraud.38 Identity theft is the fastest growing crime in America,
impacting more than 16.7 million Americans in 2017.39 In 2018, although the
number of identity theft victims was 14.4 million, 3.3 million people were
responsible for some financial liability of the fraud committed against them.40
In 2018, identity theft victims bore $1.7 billion in out-of-pocket identity theft
costs.41
Identity theft has severe consequences for children and adults. For
example, in 2017, one million of the identity theft victims were children,
causing the families more than $540 million in out of pocket expenses and a
total of $2.6 billion in losses.42 Statistics also show that 77.3 percent of
identity theft victims report emotional distress stemming from identity
theft.43 Among those victims, children also experience emotional distress,
such as stress, anger, and concern by the theft of their personal information.44
In general, identity theft victims suffer financial stress and exhibit similar
emotional effects as victims of violent crimes, ranging from anxiety to
emotional volatility.45 Victims also often experience loss of confidence in
areas where they typically had confidence, sleeplessness, isolation, selfblame, vulnerability, difficulty eating, self-medication with alcohol or food,
and loss of motivation.46 When it comes to family relations, identity theft can
also cause trouble at home, with 17 percent of victims reporting suffering in
their personal relationships as a result of the child identity fraud.47 These
identity theft instances lead parents to believe that they should have done
more to protect their children from identity theft, and the child victims also
feel the same way.48

38 What
to
Know
About
Identify
Theft,
FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-identity-theft (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
39 Bill
Fay,
What
Is
Identity
Theft?,
DEBT.ORG
(May
22,
2020),
https://www.debt.org/credit/identity-theft/.
40 INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 30.
41 Id.
42 Jennifer Bellemare, What Are Your Odds of Getting Your Identity Stolen?, IDENTITYFORCE
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.identityforce.com/blog/identity-theft-odds-identity-theft-statistics; Stefan
Lembo Stolba, The Emotional Toll of Child Identity Theft, EXPERIAN (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/the-emotional-toll-of-child-identity-theft/.
43 Bellemare, supra note 42.
44 Stolba, supra note 42.
45 EQUIFAX, A LASTING IMPACT: THE EMOTIONAL TOLL OF IDENTITY THEFT (Feb. 2015),
https://www.equifax.com/assets/PSOL/15-9814_psol_emotionalToll_wp.pdf.
46 Id.
47 Stolba, supra note 42.
48 Id.
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In addition, identity theft is one of the most common consequences of
data breaches.49 For example, in 2016, 31.7 percent of breach victims later
experienced identity theft, compared to just 2.8 percent of individuals not
notified of a data breach in 2016.50 Worldwide, identity theft is the most
common type of data breach incident, accounting for 59 percent of all global
data breach incidents in 2016.51 Regardless, whether the breach is a data
breach or identity theft, the victims should have a right to bring an action in
federal court. The next section addresses the requirements the victim must
meet to bring such an action in federal court and the current stance of the
district courts on this issue.
III. ANALYSIS
a. Constitutional Standing Requirements
Under Article III of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of federal courts is
limited to Cases and Controversies.52 In Raines, the Supreme Court
explained that “[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper
role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”53 In other words, this
restriction is critical to the success of our separation of powers structure.54 To
satisfy this constitutional requirement, a plaintiff must have standing to sue.55
“[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”56
At an irreducible constitutional minimum, standing requires the plaintiff
to prove three elements.57 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in
fact,” which is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and
particularized, and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or

49

Bellemare, supra note 42.
Matt
Tatham,
Identity
Theft
Statistics,
EXPERIAN
(Mar.
15,
2018),
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/identity-theft-statistics/.
51 Gemalto Releases Findings of 2016 Breach Level Index, THALES GROUP (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/press-release/gemalto-releasesfindings-of-2016-breach-levelindex#:~:text=Identity%20theft%20was%20the%20leading,the%20time%20they%20were%20reported.
52 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
53 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
54 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006).
55 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
56 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
57 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
50
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‘hypothetical.’”58 The injury in fact requirement of standing “serves to ensure
that the plaintiff has a personal stake in the litigation.”59 For example, in
Monsanto, the Court found that a group of conventional alfalfa growers had
suffered an injury in fact as a result of a government decision to deregulate
genetically engineered alfalfa.60 Specifically, the conventional growers
alleged that the deregulation would harm them because their neighbors would
plant genetically engineered seeds, bees would obtain pollen from those
plants, and the bees would then contaminate the farmers’ own conventional
alfalfa with the genetically modified gene.61 The Court held that the
conventional growers suffered an injury in fact because they would have to
conduct testing to find out whether and to what extent their crops have been
contaminated, and they would have to take measures to minimize the
likelihood of potential contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of
non-genetically-engineered alfalfa.62 The Court found that there was an
injury in fact even when the crops were not infected with the genetically
modified gene.63
Second, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of.64 To meet the causal connection element, the
injury must be “fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court.”65 For example, in Duke Power, the Court found a causal
connection between passing a law that limited the liability of private utilities
in the event of nuclear accidents and provided for indemnification, and the
environmental and aesthetic harm alleged by plaintiffs because “but for” the
passage of the law there was a “substantial likelihood” that the nuclear power
plants would not be constructed, and therefore the environmental and
aesthetic harm alleged by plaintiffs would not occur.66
Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the
injury will be “redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”67 For example, in
Simon, the Court held that poor people who had been denied service at certain
hospitals failed to meet the redressability element because the poor

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–56 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 72–78 (1978).
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
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individuals could not show that changing the challenged IRS policy
(extended tax benefits to hospitals that did not serve indigents) would cause
the hospitals to alter their policies and treat them.68
i.

Injury in Fact Requirement

A plaintiff can establish an injury in fact by claiming a future injury
when that injury is (a) “certainly impending” or (b) if there is a “substantial
risk” that the harm will occur.69 For example, in the landmark case Lujan,
environmental organizations dedicated to the protection of wildlife sued the
government for new regulations that limited the geographic scope of previous
environmental regulations.70 The previous environmental regulations
required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior or the
Secretary of Commerce before undertaking actions that could jeopardize
endangered or threatened species, which extended to actions taken in foreign
nations.71 The purpose of the environmental regulations was to protect the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species and to
prevent the destruction or adverse modification of the habitats of such
species.72 The organizations claimed to have standing based on some of the
members’ testimony that they had traveled to different countries to observe
endangered species and planned to travel to those countries again in the
future.73 For example, one of the members of one of the environmental
organizations claimed that she traveled to Egypt in 1986 to observe the
traditional habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile and she intended to do so
again.74 Another member claimed that she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and
observed the habitat of the Asian elephant and leopard, both endangered
species, and that she intended to return to Sri Lanka in the future to observe
the elephant and leopard since she had not been able to spot them in her
previous trip.75 The Court rejected the organizations’ theory of standing
because it was based on the organizations’ members’ intent to return to these
locations someday, and it was not “imminent.” 76

68

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976).
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 168 (2014); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013).
70 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 558.
73 Id. at 563–64.
74 Id. at 563.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 564 n.2.
69
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Similarly, in Clapper, where the Court also held that an injury was not
imminent, attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations
whose work allegedly requires them to engage in sensitive privileged
communications with individuals abroad challenged a provision of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.77 The challengers argued that
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that their private conversations with
foreigners would be intercepted.78 The challengers claimed that they
communicate “with people the Government ‘believes or believed to be
associated with terrorist organizations,’ ‘people located in geographic areas
that are a special focus’ of the Government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic
efforts, and activists who oppose governments that are supported by the
United States Government.”79 The Court held that the attorneys and human
rights, labor, legal, and media organizations had not suffered an injury in fact
because that injury rested on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” and
therefore, the injury was too speculative to satisfy the injury in fact
requirement.80 Specifically, the U.S. persons had to rely on a series of
possibilities, such as whether intelligence officials would seek to use the
surveillance methods under the challenged provision or whether judges
would authorize such surveillance.81
Similarly, in Lyons, where the Court found that the Plaintiff had not
suffered an injury in fact, a man was stopped by four police officers of the
City of Los Angeles for a traffic or vehicle code violation.82 Although the
man offered no resistance or threat, the officers seized the man and applied a
chokehold technique, either a “bar arm control” or the “carotid-artery
control” or both, and rendered the man unconscious and caused damage to
his larynx.83 The man alleged that the police from the City of Los Angeles
regularly and routinely applied these chokeholds when they are not
threatened by the use of any deadly force.84 The Court held that in this civil
rights action, the man lacked standing to enjoin the Los Angeles Police
Department from using the controversial chokehold techniques on
arrestees.85 The Court held that although the arrestee had already been
subjected to this treatment, which rendered him unconscious, the future harm
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Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 404–06, 410 (2013).
Id. at 410.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 105–06.

18 - DE LA ROSA (DO NOT DELETE)

Can You “STAND” and Sue in Federal Court?

2021]

7/11/2021 12:37 PM

133

he sought to enjoin depended on the police arresting him and choking him
again.86 The Court found that this injury was too speculative.87
In contrast, in Driehaus, the Court found an injury in fact where a former
Congressman filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission and
claimed that an advocacy group violated an Ohio law that criminalizes false
statements made during a political campaign.88 The advocacy group made a
statement saying that the Congressman’s vote in favor of the Affordable Care
Act was a vote in favor of taxpayer-funded abortion.89 After the Congressman
lost the election, the Congressman dismissed the complaint, but the advocacy
group sued in federal court challenging the Ohio law on First Amendment
grounds.90 The Court held that the advocacy group had standing to bring a
pre-enforcement challenge to an Ohio statute prohibiting false statements
during election campaigns.91 The Court reasoned that the advocacy group had
suffered an injury in fact because the group could face criminal prosecution,
it faced a substantial risk of administrative enforcement based on the history
of past enforcement, and because any person with knowledge of the
purported violation could file a complaint against the group.92 The Court
found an injury in fact even though the challenge was based on a complaint
that had not been made regarding a statement the group had not yet uttered
against a candidate not yet identified.93 The Federal Circuits are split in their
decisions as to what is sufficient to establish an injury in fact.
b. Circuit Split
i.

The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of
Appeals Find that an Increased Risk of Future Identity Theft
is Sufficient to Establish an Injury in Fact.

Courts in the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and DC Circuits have been adamant
in providing data breach victims with the opportunity to seek relief for their
heightened risk of identity theft and inconveniences that arise as a result of
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Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 151–52 (2014).
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the breach. The following paragraphs provide a summary of these circuits’
stance and how they have arrived at their decisions.
Precedent from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals establishes that a
plaintiff’s increased risk of identity theft after a data breach is sufficient to
prove an injury in fact.94 For example, in Galaria, cyber hackers broke into
an insurance and financial services company’s database that maintained
records containing customers’ sensitive personal information such as names,
dates of birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations, employers, Social
Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers.95 The court found that the
customers met the injury requirement because they alleged a substantial risk
of harm for suffering future identity theft and for reasonably incurring
mitigation costs to deal with the effects of having personal data stolen.96 The
court reasoned that when a data breach targets personal information, a
reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victim’s data
for fraudulent purposes.97 The court highlighted that although it might not be
“literally certain” that a data breach victim’s data will be misused, there is a
sufficiently substantial risk of harm that victims will incur mitigation costs.98
The court further explained that where customers already know that they lost
control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect the customers to wait
for actual identity theft or fraud to occur before taking steps to ensure their
personal and financial security, and file suit against the company for its
negligence in handling the data.99
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also found in several cases that
plaintiffs who were victims of data breaches suffered an injury in fact
necessary to establish standing based on an increased risk of identity theft.100
For example, in Remijas, Neiman Marcus customers sued the high-end
department store because the store suffered a data breach that potentially
exposed the customers’ credit card information.101 The customers alleged that
they had standing to sue based on the increased risk of future fraudulent
charges and greater susceptibility to identity theft.102 The Seventh Circuit
held that the customers’ increased risk of identity theft was concrete and
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Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 386.
96 Id. at 388.
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100 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015); Lewert v. P.F.
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 2016).
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particularized enough to support Article III standing.103 The court found that
the increased risk of identity theft was not a mere allegation of possible future
injury but the type of “certainly impending” future harm that the Supreme
Court requires to establish standing.104 The court reasoned that the alleged
data breach had already occurred—stealing all the customers’ personal
data—and therefore the court did not need to speculate as to whether the
information had been stolen or what kind of information had been stolen.105
The court further explained that the customers should not have to wait until
the hackers committed identity theft to give them standing because there was
an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that such injury would occur.106
In addition, in Remijas, the court also noted that requiring the customers
to wait until their identity was actually stolen would make it more difficult
for the customers to meet the “fairly traceable” element of standing.107
Specifically, the court reasoned that “the more time that passes between a
data breach and an instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant
has to argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s
data breach.”108 The court also noted that the only reason hackers would
break into the store’s database and steal consumers’ private information is to
sooner or later assume the customers’ identities.109
Similarly, in Lewert, the court found the increased risk of identity theft
was concrete where restaurant customers sued P.F. Chang’s alleging
increased risk of identity theft based on a data breach that exposed consumer
credit and debit card data.110 After the data breach, one of the named
customers for this class action purchased a credit monitoring service to
protect against identity theft, including against criminals using the stolen
card’s data to open new credit or debit cards in his name.111 Although the
other named customer did not spot any fraudulent charges on his card, nor
did he cancel his card or suffer the associated inconvenience or costs, he did
spend time and effort monitoring his card statements and his credit report to
ensure that no fraudulent charges had been made on his card or that no
fraudulent accounts had been opened in his name.112 The Seventh Circuit held
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Id. at 693.
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Id. (quoting In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 2014 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
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that the increased risk of identity theft was concrete enough to support a
lawsuit.113 The court reasoned that a substantial risk of harm arose from the
data breach because the primary incentive for hackers is to assume those
consumers’ identities or to make fraudulent charges to their credit cards.114
The court explained that even though some of the customers could have
canceled their credit cards, they all still faced the risk of identity theft, and
that was sufficient to establish the injury in fact element of standing.115
Similar to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has also
found that plaintiffs can meet the injury in fact element by claiming increased
risk of identity theft stemming from a data breach.116 For example, in
Krottner, former and current employees sued Starbucks because their names,
addresses, and Social Security numbers were stored on a laptop that a thief
stole from Starbucks.117 The Ninth Circuit held that the employees’ increased
risk of future identity theft was sufficient to establish an injury in fact because
the employees faced a “credible threat of harm,” that was both “real and
immediate” and not “conjectural or hypothetical.”118 The court further
explained that the employee’s allegations were more than “conjectural or
hypothetical” because the laptop containing the customer’s unencrypted
personal information had already been stolen.119 The court clarified that it
would not have reached the same decision if the employees had sued when
the laptop had not been stolen and the customers would have claimed an
injury in fact based on the risk that the laptop would have been stolen at some
point in the future.120
Similarly, in In re Zappos.com, a Ninth Circuit case, the court found an
injury in fact where customers sued online retailer Zappos after hackers
breached Zappos’ database and allegedly stole personal identifying
information belonging to 24 million customers, including their “names,
account numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping
addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card information.”121 The
customers claimed that they met the injury in fact requirement of standing
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because the Zappos data breach put them at risk of identity theft.122 In this
case, the customers relied on the United States Government Accountability
Office for the definition of identity theft, which includes “various types of
criminal activities, such as when Personal Identifying Information is used to
commit fraud or other crimes,” including “credit card fraud, phone or utility
fraud, bank fraud, and government fraud.”123 The court held that the
customers had alleged an injury in fact sufficient to establish standing
because the information stolen, which included credit card numbers, could
be easily used to commit identity theft.124 In addition, the court noted that
even if a long time had passed between the breach and the customers’ suit,
the customers’ injury was imminent because “a person whose personal
identifying information has been obtained and compromised may not see the
full extent of identity theft or identity fraud for years.”125
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has also held
that the increased risk of identity theft arising from a data breach is sufficient
to establish an injury in fact for standing purposes.126 For example, in Attias,
the customers of a health insurance company sued the insurance company for
a cyberattack that exposed the customer’s personal identifying information
such as their credit card numbers and Social Security numbers.127 The court
found that the customers met their burden of proving an injury in fact because
the customers’ heightened risk of identity theft was substantial enough.128
The court reasoned that the breach “exposed all of the information
wrongdoers need” to steal a victim’s identity.129 In addition, the court
reasoned that the hackers had already gained access to the unauthorized
information, and it was reasonable to infer that the hackers had the intent and
ability to use the data for “ill.”130 The court also stated that the hackers’
purpose in breaking into a database and stealing consumers’ private
information is to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’
identities.131 The court explained that a substantial risk of harm existed
simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the customers
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alleged was taken.132 The court noted that the customers did not need to rely
on a series of “uncertain contingencies involving multiple independent
actors” before the customers suffered any harm.133
Similarly, in OPM, another D.C. Circuit case, the court found an injury
in fact where cyber attackers breached U.S. government employee databases
and stole government employees’ sensitive personal information, including
birth dates, Social Security numbers, addresses, and fingerprint records.134
The court held that the government employees established the injury in fact
element because they faced a “substantial” risk of future identity theft.135
First, the court reasoned that the hackers had in their possession all the
information they needed to steal the employees’ identities, including the
employees’ social security numbers, birth dates, and addresses.136 Second,
the court noted that the employees’ faced a substantial risk of identity theft
because sensitive personal information cannot be changed to avoid identity
theft.137 For example, while existing credit card numbers can be changed to
prevent future fraud, Social Security numbers and addresses cannot be easily
changed for new ones, and “birth dates and fingerprints stay with us
forever.”138 Third, the court highlighted that the employees’ risk of identity
theft was substantial because some of the employees had already experienced
various types of identity theft, such as the unauthorized opening of new credit
cards and the filing of fraudulent tax returns in their names.139 Lastly, the
court reasoned that the attackers had intentionally targeted stealing the
employees’ private information.140
While several federal courts such as the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits have expressly ruled on this standing issue in regard to data breaches,
some courts like the Eleventh Circuit have however, issued opinions on risks
of identity theft standing that would also allow victims to bring such cases in
Federal court.
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ii. Although Not in a Data Breach Case, the Eleventh Circuit
Has Found that the Risk of Identity Theft Is Sufficient for a
Plaintiff to Have Standing to Sue in Federal Court.
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not issued an opinion regarding an
increased risk of identity theft resulting from a data breach, the Eleventh
Circuit has found standing in an increased risk of identity theft under other
circumstances.141 For example, in Muransky, the Eleventh Circuit found that
a consumer had suffered an injury in fact when Godiva issued him a receipt
that showed his credit card number’s first six and last four digits in violation
of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”).142 In that case,
the Eleventh Circuit found an injury in fact based on the customer’s
heightened risk of identity theft stemming from Godiva’s violation of
FACTA.143 The court noted that the customer had established risk of real
harm to a concrete interest sufficient to establish standing because a
consumer undoubtedly has a concrete interest in preventing his identity from
actually being stolen.144
iii. Notwithstanding the Strong Reasoning Presented by the
Other Circuits, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit
Courts of Appeals Have Refused to Find an Injury in Fact
Based on an Increased Risk of Identity Theft.
Presented with the opportunity to redress the inconveniencies of
millions of individuals whose personal information is stolen yearly through
data breaches as a result of companies’ mishandling their data, the Second,
Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have refused to find that
these individuals have suffered an injury in fact.145 For example, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has found that under certain circumstances, an
increased risk of identity theft arising from a data breach is not sufficient to
establish the injury in fact requirement for standing.146 For example, in
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Whalen, Michaels, the arts and crafts store, suffered a data breach.147 A
customer sued Michaels after receiving two fraudulent charges on the same
credit card she had used to shop at Michaels.148 The customer alleged that her
credit card was physically presented for payment to a gym in Ecuador for a
charge of $398.16.149 The credit card was also presented for payment to a
concert ticket company in Ecuador for a value of $1,320.00.150 Among her
theories of injuries, the customer asserted an increased risk of future identity
theft.151 The court held that the customer did not allege a concrete and
particularized injury because she failed to show how she could “plausibly
face a threat of future fraud.”152 The court reasoned that the customer had
canceled her credit card after the breach and that no other personally
identifying information, such as name, address, PIN, social security, or date
of birth, had been stolen in the breach.153 In this case, no charges were
actually incurred on the card and she was not liable for any of the attempted
charges.154 In addition, the court reasoned that the customer lacked standing
because she failed to allege with any specificity if she had spent any time or
money monitoring her credit.155
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has also found that an increased risk
of identity theft is not sufficient to establish Article III standing.156 For
example, in Reilly, cyber hackers infiltrated a payroll processor’s network
and “potentially gained access to personal and financial information”
belonging to employees.157 The personal information obtained included the
employees’ names, addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and
bank account information.158 This case was decided before Clapper, where
the Supreme Court elicited the “substantial risk test.”159 In Reilly, the Third
Circuit held that the employees had not established an injury in fact based on
an increased risk of future identity theft because the identity theft was not
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“certainly impending.”160 Specifically, the court reasoned that the
employees’ allegations of increased risk of identity theft relied on speculation
that the hacker: “(1) read, copied, and understood [the employees’] personal
information; (2) intended to commit future criminal acts by misusing the
information; and (3) was able to use such information to the detriment of the
employees by making unauthorized transactions in the employees’
names.”161 The court further reasoned that in this case, the employees did not
show evidence that the intrusion was intentional or malicious.162 The court
focused on the fact that there had been no misuse of the information yet,
therefore, no harm had taken place.163 The court also highlighted that no
identifiable taking occurred because all the court knew was that a firewall
had been penetrated.164
The Fourth Circuit has also rejected the notion that an increased risk of
identity theft is sufficient to establish Article III standing.165 For example, in
Beck, a laptop containing patients’ unencrypted personal identifying
information such as names, birth dates, the last four digits of their Social
Security numbers, and physical descriptors was misplaced or stolen.166
Medical record boxes that contained patients’ names, Social Security
numbers, and medical diagnoses also went missing.167 The patients claimed
Article III standing based on an increased risk of future identity theft.168 The
court held that the risk of future identity theft stemming from the incidents
was too speculative to satisfy the injury in fact requirement because the
plaintiffs failed to allege either (i) that the thief “intentionally targeted” the
personal information contained in the laptop and boxes; or (ii) that the thief
subsequently used that information to commit identity theft.169
The court in Beck distinguished its case from Krottner, Remijas, and
Galaria, cases where the courts had found that increased risk of identity theft
was sufficient to establish an injury in fact.170 The court explained that in
Galaria and Remijas, “the data thief intentionally targeted the personal
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information compromised in the data breaches.”171 In addition, the court
highlighted that in Remijas and Krottner, at least one of the victims of the
data breach had already alleged “misuse or access by the thieves” to the
personal information stolen in the breach.172 The court noted that in this case,
the patients did not provide any evidence that the information found in the
laptop has been accessed or misused, that they suffered identity theft, or that
the thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private information.173
The Fourth Circuit also found the risk of identity theft is not substantial
enough to invoke standing unless the victims affected can show the risk was
not speculative by showing an attenuated chain of possibilities.174 For
example, in Beck, the court also reasoned that for the patients to suffer the
harm of identity theft they claimed, the patients had to engage in the same
“attenuated chain of possibilities” analysis the Court had rejected in
Clapper.175 The court explained that the patients’ alleged identity theft was
speculative because the court had to assume that (1) the thieves intended to
steal the items to get patients’ personal information, (2) the thieves would
then select the named patients’ personal information among all the other
patients, and (3) the thieves would successfully use that information to steal
the patients’ identity.176 The court further rejected the patients’ argument that
33 percent of health-related data breaches result in identity theft because
those statistics fall short of establishing a “substantial risk” of harm since
over 66 percent of the patients will suffer no harm.177
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also held that an
increased risk of identity theft is not sufficient to meet the injury in fact
requirement.178 For example, in Alleruzzo, cybercriminals hacked grocery
stores’ databases and gained access to the payment card information of
customers, including their names, credit or debit card account numbers,
expiration dates, card verification value (CVV) codes, and personal
identification numbers (PINs).179 The allegedly stolen card information did
not include any personally identifying information, such as Social Security
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numbers, birth dates, or driver’s license numbers.180 The customers claimed
a heightened chance of experiencing identity theft was their injury in fact.181
The court held that the customers did not show an injury in fact because
compromised credit card information could not be used to open unauthorized
accounts, which is the type of identity theft generally considered to have a
more harmful direct effect on consumers.182 The court relied on a report
released by the United States Government Accountability Office from June
2007 that explained that “credit or debit card information such as card
numbers and expiration dates generally cannot be used alone to open
unauthorized new accounts.”183
In addition, in Alleruzo, the court found that the time individuals spend
to protect themselves from identity theft after a data breach is not sufficient
to establish an injury in fact.184 In Alleruzo, plaintiffs also argued that the
costs they incurred to mitigate their risk of identity theft, including the time
they spent reviewing information about the breach and monitoring their
account information, constitute an injury in fact for purposes of standing.185
Because the court found that plaintiffs had not alleged a substantial risk of
future identity theft, the court also found that the time they spent protecting
themselves against this speculative threat cannot create an injury.186 The
court refused to find an injury in fact even though the hackers installed a
malware on the company’s network that allowed them to “harvest” the
plaintiffs’ credit card information, the company’s practices allowed and made
possible the theft of plaintiffs’ card information, and that plaintiffs had
actually already suffered theft of their card information.187
While several federal courts, such as the Second, Third, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, have expressly refused to find an injury in
fact based on an increased risk of identity theft in data breach cases, the First
Circuit has found that the risk of identity theft is not sufficient to support
standing in other situations.
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iv. Although Not in a Data Breach Case, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals Has Found that the Risk of Identity Theft Is Not
Sufficient for a Plaintiff to Have Standing to Sue in Federal
Court.
Although the First Circuit has not addressed whether a plaintiff who was
the victim of a data breach suffered an injury in fact based on an increased
risk of identity theft, the First Circuit has faced a similar question relating to
increased risk of identity theft.188 For example, in Katz, a customer sued a
company for allegedly leaving her nonpublic personal information, including
social security numbers and taxpayer-identification numbers, unprotected
and accessible to prying eyes.189 Specifically, the customer claimed that the
company’s users can “access and store her data at home and elsewhere,
twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, in unencrypted form; that
the data, once saved by an authorized user, can potentially be accessed by
hackers or other third parties; and that the company failed adequately to
monitor unauthorized access to her information.”190 Among her alleged
injuries, the customer claimed that the company’s failure to follow privacy
regulations increased her risk of harms associated with the loss of her data,
including identity theft.191 The court held that the customer’s theory for
standing was insufficient because, unlike other cases where courts have
found an injury in fact based on a similar theory, the customer’s data, in this
case, had not actually been accessed by one or more unauthorized parties.192
The customer’s injury was too hypothetical because she only alleged an
increased risk that someone might access her data and that if this
unauthorized access occurs, then it will increase her risk of identity theft.193
Two courts remain that have not yet addressed whether a victim of a
data breach has suffered an injury in fact sufficient to have standing to bring
a claim in federal court.
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v. The Fifth and the Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals Have Not
Analyzed Whether a Plaintiff Who Has Been the Victim of a
Data Breach Has Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an
Increased Risk of Identity Theft.
Almost every Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed whether a plaintiff
can establish an injury in fact based solely on the increased risk of identity
theft as it relates to data breaches or a printed receipt disclosing a credit card
number, in the case of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits are the only appeals courts that have not yet
addressed the issue.194
vi. The Supreme Court Has Refused to Weigh in as to Whether
Plaintiffs Who Sue in Federal Court and Claim an Increased
Risk of Identity Theft Have Alleged an Injury in Fact.
Despite the federal circuits’ divide regarding whether a plaintiff who has
been the victim of a data breach has suffered an injury in fact from an
increased risk of identity theft, the issue has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court even when it has had the chance to do so.195 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari to hear Attias v. Carefirst, a case that specifically
addressed the issue of whether victims of data breaches have suffered an
injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.196 In Attias,
customers sued a health insurance company after the company suffered a
cyberattack in which its customers’ personal information was allegedly
stolen.197 The customers claimed to have suffered an increased risk of identity
theft as their injury in fact .198 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia found that the customers alleged a risk of future injury substantial
enough to meet the injury in fact requirement of Article III standing.199 In
2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear the appeal of this case and
failed to answer the circuit split.200
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c. Resolving the Circuit Split
The Supreme Court should resolve the federal district court split and
find that a data breach victim has suffered an injury in fact, especially in
modern times, where employees can easily work remotely, and an
individual’s information can get easily exposed to hackers. First, previous
Supreme Court decisions regarding injuries in fact support finding that the
victim of a data breach has suffered an injury in fact. Second, statistics and
legislative action show a correlation between data breaches and identity theft.
Third, finding an injury in fact is the equitable result based on the
pervasiveness of data breaches and the burden a data breach imposes on a
victim. Courts should find that a plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, even
in cases where the stolen information was not found in a database, and instead
was found in a laptop or box, and even when the information found is credit
card information, such as credit card numbers, PINs, and expiration dates.
i.

The Supreme Court’s Previous Decisions that Relate Support
a Finding that a Plaintiff Who Has Been the Victim of a Data
Breach Has Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an Increased
Risk of Identity Theft.

The Supreme Court’s previous decisions regarding standing support
finding that a person who has been the victim of a data breach has suffered
an injury in fact. For example, in Clapper, the Supreme Court noted that a
plaintiff can establish an injury in fact when he or she proves that he or she
has a “substantial risk” of suffering the alleged harm.201 In Clapper, the Court
only rejected the plaintiffs’ theory of standing because the plaintiffs had to
rely on a series of speculative inferences to establish the injury.202
Specifically, the attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media
organizations had to speculate as to whether intelligence officials would seek
to use the surveillance methods under the challenged provision or whether
judges would authorize such surveillance.203 Similarly, in Lyons, the Court
only rejected a former prisoner’s theory of standing because the prisoner
challenging a chokehold technique had to assume that he would be arrested
and choked by the police again.204 However, these Supreme Court cases
support a finding of an injury in fact when a plaintiff has been the victim of
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a data breach and personal identifying information, such as names, dates of
birth, Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, home addresses,
telephone numbers, and fingerprint records, has been stolen, because the
injury is not speculative.
First, the sole purpose of data breaches is to get access to a victim’s
credit card or personal identifying information.205 The next step following a
data breach is to use this information in a detrimental way to the customer.206
The most common and well-known way to use that information is by
committing identity theft.207 As explained by the Seventh Circuit, the only
reason hackers break into a database and steal people’s private information,
is to sooner or later assume the customer’s identity.208 Although it might not
be completely certain that all of the plaintiff’s stolen data will be used to steal
the plaintiff’s identity, a court can find that there is a substantial likelihood
that the information will be misused for identity fraud purposes.209 In these
types of cases, the data has already been intentionally stolen, therefore the
next step for the hackers to benefit from the theft is to use personal
information to commit identity theft and fraud.210 Once a data breach takes
place, the hackers have unlimited access to all the information they need to
successfully steal a victim’s identity.211 The fact that a data breach has
already taken place shows the hacker’s intent and ability to use the data in a
way that harms the plaintiffs.212 In addition, this type of injury is not
speculative because the harm, which is to steal the customer’s information
with the intent to harm the customer, has already been done. In essence, the
substantial risk of harm exists simply by the virtue of the hack and the nature
of the personal identifying data stolen.213 The court does not need to engage
in the kind of speculative inferences rejected in Clapper and Lyons to assume
that the next natural step following a data breach is to use the data for identity
theft and fraud.214
In addition, Plaintiffs who claim an increased risk of identity theft
because of a data breach face a similar situation to the facts of Driehaous,
205
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where the Court found the injury was not speculative.215 In Driehaous, the
Supreme Court found that an advocacy group had suffered an injury in fact
because the group faced a substantial risk of administrative enforcement of
the challenged statute based on the history of past enforcement and because
any person with knowledge of the violation of the statute could file a
complaint against the advocacy group.216 The Supreme Court found standing
even when the advocacy group sued based on a political statement that the
group had not yet made against a political candidate not yet identified.217 The
Court found in favor of the advocacy group even when the challenged statute
had not yet been enforced against the group nor someone who would file the
complaint against the group had been identified.218 In that case, the Court did
not find the kind of speculative, highly attenuated chain of possibilities it had
previously rejected in Clapper and Lyons, and instead found that the
advocacy group had suffered an injury in fact based on the substantial risk of
statutory enforcement against them.
Plaintiffs who have suffered a breach of their personal data have an even
stronger case for standing to sue than the advocacy group in Driehaous.219
Similar to the advocacy group in Driehaous, the plaintiffs whose personal
data has been stolen face a substantial risk of identity theft based on the nature
of the personal identifying data stolen, the purpose of data breaches, and the
statistics that show a strong correlation between data breaches and identity
theft, especially the correlation between data breaches that have
compromised personal identifying information and identity theft.220 The
plaintiffs’ sensitive information has already been stolen. The next natural step
is for the hackers to actually use the information to the victim’s disadvantage.
It is not speculative or hypothetical to assume that the information will be
used for identity theft because that is precisely the purpose of a data breach.
Similar to the holding in Driehaous, courts do not have to rely on a series of
highly attenuated chain of possibilities to conclude that victims of a data
breach suffer a “substantial risk” of becoming victims of identity theft.221
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Therefore, previous Supreme Court decisions support a finding that
plaintiffs who have been the victims of a data breach have suffered an injury
in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.
ii. The Statistical Correlation Between Data Breaches and
Identity Theft and Legislative Action Supports a Finding that
a Plaintiff Who Has Been the Victim of a Data Breach Has
Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an Increased Risk of
Identity Theft.
Identity theft is strongly correlated to data breaches. Analysts estimated
that in 2014, one in three Americans affected by a data breach ultimately
became the victim of financial fraud or identity theft.222 These statistics show
a significant increase in the correlation between data breaches and financial
fraud or identity theft from 2010, where it was estimated that one in nine
Americans who suffered a data breach then became the victim of identity
theft or financial fraud.223 In addition, in 2016, 31.7% of data breach victims
later became the victims of identity theft, compared to a very low 2.8% of
individuals whose information was not involved in a data breach in 2016 and
still became the victims of identity theft.224 In 2018, the number of personal
records exposed increased up to 446,515,334 from 197,612,748 in 2017,
which analysts correlated to an expected increase in the number of identity
theft victims in 2018.225
Even state legislative actions support the idea that identity theft is highly
correlated to data breaches. Specifically, state legislatures have shown that
once a person has become the victim of a data breach, the victim has to take
certain steps to protect itself from identity theft and fraud.226 Legislatures
have recognized that action needs to be taken after a data breach because of
the high correlation between data breaches and identity theft.227 For example,
due to the frequency and severity of data breaches, all fifty state legislatures
have passed security breach notification laws.228 These laws provide citizens
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with the right to be notified in a timely manner once their records have been
exposed in a data breach.229 Therefore, statistics and legislative action support
a finding that victims of a data breach have suffered an injury in fact based
on an increased risk of identity theft.
iii. Courts Should Find that Plaintiffs Who Have Been the
Victims of a Data Breach Have Suffered an Injury in Fact
Based on an Increased Risk of Identity Theft Because That Is
an Equitable Result Based on the Pervasiveness of Data
Breaches and the Burden a Data Breach Imposes on a Victim.
Allowing plaintiffs who have been the victims of a data breach to sue in
federal court based on an increased risk of identity theft is also an equitable
result. Although the purpose of standing is to limit the judiciary power, the
purpose of having a judiciary branch is to provide injured parties with
redressability and a remedy in court. That is why the Founding Fathers
included Article III, Section 1 in our Constitution, creating a judiciary.230 In
this case, it is equitable to allow victims of data breaches to sue in federal
court because data breaches become more common every year and victims
suffer severe consequences from those data breaches.
1. Pervasiveness of Data Breaches
First, an ever-increasing number of Americans are affected by data
breaches yearly. Since 2011, the number of data breaches reported in the
United States has been rising.231 For example, in 2013, 614 data breaches
were reported.232 In 2014, that number rose to 783 data breaches.233 The
number of data breaches in 2016 increased to 1,093, further increasing to
1,579 data breaches reported in 2017.234 These numbers suggest that data
breaches have become more common in recent years, exposing a greater
number of individuals to an increased risk of identity theft and to the costs
associated with dealing with the consequences of the breach. These numbers
also suggest that the number of people who hope for a day in court against
the companies that negligently handled their personal data has increased.
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The United States is also the country with the highest ratio of data
records stolen relative to its population.235 For example, the United States
leads data breach records with 6 billion records stolen and with a ratio of 19
in comparison to its population.236 South Korea followed the United States
with 229 million and with a 4.5 ratio.237 Next, were Canada and the United
Kingdom with 91 and 140 million records stolen compared to 2.5 and 2.1
ratios respectively.238 Last, was Australia with 50 million records stolen and
with a ratio of 2.239
In addition, data breaches are so pervasive that data stolen in the United
States can be used anywhere in the world. For example, in Whalen, a
customer’s data was stolen in the United States from a purchase she made at
Michaels, and her credit card information was presented to make purchases
in Ecuador. Because data breaches affect Americans so pervasively and data
breaches are strongly correlated to identity theft, victims of data breaches
should be found to have suffered an injury in fact to be able to sue in federal
court and seek redress for their inconveniences.
2. Mitigation Economic Costs of a Data Breach
Data breaches are also costly and burdensome to the victims.240 As
explained by the Sixth Circuit, data breach victims often have to take steps
to protect their personal and financial security following a data breach.241 In
many instances, it may be very difficult and even impossible for the victims
to change the information stolen in the breach, such as Social Security
numbers, home addresses, or birth dates. In addition, for personal identifying
data, victims might have to hire an expert or purchase a software to remove
the data from the web, specifically from the “dark web” where cyber hackers
are common.242 If the victim does not take these steps, the victim may be at
risk of being “victimized repeatedly over time as the data is reused and
resold.”243 Therefore, becoming the victim of a data breach can be unsettling
235 Ron
Sobers, The World in Data Breaches, VARONIS (Mar. 29, 2020),
https://www.varonis.com/blog/the-world-in-data-breaches/.
236 Id.
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240 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
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242 See Wendy M. Grossman, The Impact of a Breach: When the Fallout Means More than Money,
INFO SECURITY MAG. (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/magazinefeatures/impact-of-a-breach-more-than-money/.
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and costly. In addition to the costs of data breaches, data breach victims
should be allowed to sue in federal courts based on an increased risk of
identity theft because data breach victims “may not see the full extent of
identity theft or identity fraud” for many years to come.244 Because of the
economic costs associated with a data breach to prevent severe consequences
such as identity theft, courts should find that a data breach victim has suffered
an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.
3. Emotional Costs of a Data Breach
In addition, data breaches have lasting emotional effects on the victims,
instilling fear, anxiety, and even danger.245 Following a data breach notice,
individuals often experience fear and anxiety that the data breach will lead to
identity theft, and anger that the breached entity was so careless with their
personal information.246 For example, data breaches of medical records
provoke extensive anxiety.247 Victims of medical records data breaches are
concerned with issues such as whether medical identity theft will cause them
to be refused medical care.248 Because of the lasting emotional effects, a data
breach victim can suffer, courts should find that a victim of a data breach has
suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.
iv. Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s Finding in Beck, the Victim of a
Data Breach from a Stolen Laptop Is Sufficient to Find that
the Victim Has Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an
Increased Risk of Identity Theft.
The theory that an increased risk of identity theft resulting from a data
breach is sufficient to establish an injury stands even when the item stolen
was a laptop with unencrypted personal identifying data. In contrast, in Beck,
the Fourth Circuit found that patients did not have standing to sue based on
an increased risk of identity theft when a laptop and medical record boxes
containing the patients’ personal identifying information were stolen.249 The
court mainly reasoned that the patients failed to prove that the thief had
intentionally targeted the personal information contained in the laptop or
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boxes or that the thief had subsequently used the information to commit
identity theft.250 Nonetheless, the only reason why a thief would target boxes
that contain personally identifying information is to use that information in
some way to their advantage. Empty boxes without the personally identifying
information have no value to a thief; therefore, the only plausible reason why
those boxes were taken was for the same reason that thieves penetrate
encrypted databases. The same reasoning applies to the stolen laptop. The
actual device has little value without the personally identifying information
that can be used to later steal the patients’ identity and commit fraud. Also,
in Beck, the fact that the only items stolen were a laptop and a box containing
patients’ personally identifying information speaks as to the intent of the
thieves. Similar to a breach in an online database, the information necessary
to commit identity theft has already been stolen, and the next natural step of
the theft is for the thief is to use that information in a way that benefits them
and harms the victims. Specifically, the next step is for the thief to commit
identity theft or fraud.
v. Unlike the Eighth Circuit’s Decision in Alleruzzo, Stolen
Credit Card Information Such as Credit Card Number, PIN,
and Expiration Date Can Give Rise to an Injury in Fact Based
on an Increased Risk of Identity Theft.
An increased risk of identity theft based on credit card data theft is
sufficient to find that a data breach victim has suffered an injury in fact. In
Alleruzzo, cybercriminals hacked grocery stores’ databases and gained access
to the payment card information of customers, including their names, credit
or debit card account numbers, expiration dates, card verification value
(CVV) codes, and personal identification numbers (PINs).251 The court held
that the victims had not suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk
of identity theft because credit card information could not be used to open
unauthorized accounts.252 Although credit or debit card information may not
be used alone to open new unauthorized accounts, the victims of a data breach
of this kind have still suffered an injury in fact.253 Specifically, plaintiffs’ who
have been victims of a data breach giving hackers access to the plaintiffs’
credit card information have suffered an injury in fact because they must
spend time and effort monitoring their credit card transactions or canceling
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those credit cards. The information stolen could also be sold on the black
market by the hackers. In addition, the plaintiffs have to deal with the mental
anguish that their information was stolen and the insecurity that they do not
know what the hacker might do with their information. Therefore, even if the
information stolen is not personally identifying information, a data breach of
credit or debit card information is sufficient to find that a plaintiff has
suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should weigh in on the issue and find that a Plaintiff
who has been the victim of identity theft has suffered an injury in fact
sufficient to grant standing to sue in federal court, agreeing with the Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals. First, previous Supreme
Court decisions regarding an injury in fact support that finding. Second,
statistics and legislative action show a correlation between data breaches and
identity theft. Third, finding that a Plaintiff who has been the victim of a data
breach has suffered an injury in fact is the equitable result based on the
pervasiveness of data breaches and the burden a data breach imposes on a
victim, including economic and emotional burden. Courts should also find an
injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft applies to all victims
of a data breach, including data breaches that occurred during a physical
laptop or box theft and when the information stolen in the breach is credit or
debit card information.
As the use of technology becomes more pervasive, and data breaches
and identity thefts become more common, the Supreme Court should settle
the issue once and for all and allow victims of a data breach to solve their
grievances in federal court. Under our constitution, data breach victims are
owed the chance to be heard in court, and the companies that negligently
handled their data deserve to be held accountable for their mistakes.

